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Beyond Ruggie’s Guiding Principles on
Business and Human Rights: Charting an
Embracive Approach to Corporate
Human Rights Compliance
ROBERT C. BLITT
Abstract
To what extent should or must a corporation contemplate international human
rights law? Following a brief discussion of the increasing influence of transnational
corporations and global business transactions, as well as the growth of the
international human rights system, this Article uses the 2011 United Nations’
Guiding Principles on the effective prevention of, and remedy for, business-related
human rights harm as a jumping-off point for addressing the most recent
developments related to identifying and regulating business-related human rights
practices. After identifying an emerging divide between endorsement and criticism
of the Guiding Principles, the Article concludes with a forward-looking view, arguing
that although the Guiding Principles may represent a good starting point,
corporations genuinely concerned with ensuring the effective minimization or
elimination of exposure to potentially embarrassing and costly human rights
liabilities should be prepared to apply a more rigorous approach.
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INTRODUCTION
Your corporation, Minerals R Us, is confronted with public protests and
lawsuits in various countries around the world five years into an otherwise profitable
merger with Lior Minerals Inc., a company headquartered in Gisserville, the capital
of Lioria.1 While Minerals R Us is now the primary supplier of iMineral, a key
component necessary for powering all forms of modern gadgetry, it appears that Lior
Minerals Inc. managed to extract the coveted iMineral—a complex and dangerous
process—only after displacing an indigenous tribe and employing children based on
racial preference, all the while preventing unionization through threats and the
imposition of onerous contractual terms that essentially relegated employees to
forced laborers.
At the time of the merger, no one thought to scrutinize whether Lior Minerals’
business practices violated human rights. Likewise, the cigar-chomping CEO of
Minerals R Us, Richard McKnight, never bothered to travel to Lioria to view
employee conditions firsthand because the country consistently ranked near the top
of the Failed States Index and was notorious for its widespread violence, which
particularly targeted foreigners. During discussions leading up to the merger,
McKnight was heard to remark—to affirmative nods from the board of directors—
“Mine baby, mine!” and “Who gives a rat’s ass how it gets done. Just do it.”

1. The names, places, and minerals referenced here are purely hypothetical and intended only for the
sake of example.
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While this scenario may be illustrative of past standard operating procedures for
many corporations, and arguably may persist in some boardrooms today, the
takeaway message intended from this Article cautions counsel against ignoring
human rights liabilities at their own, their principals’, and indeed even their
corporation’s peril. This advice is premised on the dynamic and increasingly socially
conscious global arena within which businesses operate, and more specifically, on the
emerging international framework intended to address business-related human rights
harms. Following a brief discussion of the increasing influence of transnational
corporations (TNCs)2 and global business transactions, as well as the growth of the
international human rights system, this Article will discuss the most recent
developments related to identifying and regulating business-related human rights
practices. The departure point for this analysis will be the March 2011 Guiding
Principles on Business and Human Rights,3 the culmination of John Ruggie’s six-year
effort as the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General
(SRSG) on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other
business enterprises.4
This report, while heralded as a milestone, is only a departure point for the
simple reason that it underestimates the rapidity in which the human rights
environment for businesses is unfolding. Human rights advocates have already
expressed concern that the SRSG’s Guiding Principles do not go far enough.5 In fact,
the principles set a minimal-expectation bar for businesses, promulgating a series of
non-binding “lowest common denominator” recommendations that arguably neglect
a more complex reality.6 Based on a consideration of the emerging divide between
endorsement and criticism of the Guiding Principles, I conclude with a forwardlooking view, arguing that although the principles may represent a good starting
point, corporations genuinely concerned with ensuring the effective minimization or
elimination of exposure to potentially embarrassing and costly human rights
liabilities should be prepared to apply a more rigorous approach.

2. For the purposes of this Article, I use the terms TNC and multinational corporation (MNC)
interchangeably. See Peter F. Drucker, The Global Economy and the Nation-State, 76 FOREIGN AFF. 159,
167–68 (1997) (noting that more multinational corporations are becoming transnational in nature).
3. Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights:
Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31
(Mar. 21, 2011) (by John Ruggie) [hereinafter Guiding Principles].
4. Shortly after his mandate as Special Representative ended, Mr. Ruggie accepted a Senior Advisor
position with Foley Hoag LLP’s Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) practice. See John G. Ruggie,
FOLEY HOAG LLP, http://www.foleyhoag.com/People/Specialists/Ruggie-John.aspx (last visited Dec. 10,
2012) (describing Ruggie’s position at Foley Hoag LLP).
5. See, e.g., UN Human Rights Council: Weak Stance on Business Standards, H UM . RTS . W ATCH
(June 16, 2011), http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2011/06/16/un-human-rights-council-weak-stance-businessstandards (stating that various organizations have expressed concern that Ruggie’s Guiding Principles are
weaker than established human rights norms).
6. See David Bilchitz, The Ruggie Framework: An Adequate Rubric for Corporate Human Rights
Obligations?, 12 SUR I NT’ L J. H UM . R TS . 199, 216 (2010), available at http://www.surjournal.org/
eng/conteudos/getArtigo12.php?artigo=12,artigo_10.htm (explaining that, in an effort to find consensus,
Ruggie undermined basic human rights standards by failing to state that corporations are bound to these
standards under international law).
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I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE RISE OF TRANSNATIONAL
CORPORATIONS, THE GLOBAL ECONOMY, AND INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS
A. The Rise of the Transnational Corporation
While the origins of the modern-day TNC can be traced back to the East India
Company7 or even to ancient Rome,8 it was not until the turn of the 20th Century
that an increasingly large number of enterprises began developing a transnational
structure. This pattern continued through the era leading up to the Second World
War, and in the period that followed expanded at an unprecedented pace, fueled by
communication and transportation advances and associated cost savings brought
about by “containerized freight, airborne deliveries and the telex.”9
In the 1960s, MNCs came to be regarded “as more progressive, dynamic, [and]
geared to the future than provincial companies which avoid foreign frontiers and
their attendant risks and opportunities.”10 Indeed, this period represented a
historical “high-water mark in the spread of the transnational networks of United
States-based industrial enterprises,” with foreign affiliates reaching an all-time high.11
By the early 1990s, virtually all industrialized countries provided a base for numerous
MNCs, which were fast becoming “the dominant form of organization responsible
for the international exchange of goods and services.”12 Likewise, the pace and scale
of mergers also began growing exponentially during this period.13
In the wake of this extraordinary pattern of growth and globalization, TNCs
found themselves in the startling position of outperforming the national economies
of states14—a dramatic turn of events considering that hitherto nation-states had been
considered the primary, if not exclusive, actors within the international order.15 To
be certain, the nation-state’s iron-fisted grip on sovereignty has been challenged from
other directions,16 but the global rise of TNCs is unique insofar as the value-added

7. NICK ROBINS, THE CORPORATION THAT CHANGED THE WORLD: HOW THE EAST INDIA
COMPANY SHAPED THE MODERN MULTINATIONAL x–xii (2006).
8. STANLEY BING, ROME, INC.: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE FIRST MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION
xv (2006).
9. Raymond Vernon, Transnational Corporations: Where are They Coming From, Where are They
Headed?, 1 TRANSNAT’L CORPS. 7, 10 (1992).
10. Howard V. Perlmutter, The Tortuous Evolution of the Multinational Corporation, COLUM. J.
WORLD BUS., Jan-Feb 1969, at 9, 10.
11. Vernon, supra note 9, at 12.
12. Id. at 7.
13. Id. at 20.
14. Consider Apple Inc.’s $76 billion pile of cash, which in mid-2011 outstripped U.S. cash reserves.
Matt Hartley, U.S. Balance Now Less Than Apple Cash, FIN. POST (July 28, 2011, 4:56 PM),
http://business.financialpost.com/2011/07/28/u-s-balance-now-less-than-apple-cash/.
15. The Charter of the United Nations reaffirms this traditional view by restricting its membership
exclusively to “other peace-loving states.” U.N. Charter art. 4, para. 1. The modern state system typically
dates to the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. Daud Hassan, The Rise of the Territorial State and The Treaty
of Westphalia, 9 Y.B. N.Z. JURIS. 62, 69 (2006).
16. See Robert Charles Blitt, Who Will Watch the Watchdogs? Human Rights Nongovernmental
Organizations and the Case for Regulation, 10 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 261, 304 n.192 (2004) (offering
examples of non-governmental organizations making critical statements that have posed a challenge to the
sovereignty of some nation-states, such as Sudan, in the past).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1907778

TEXAS INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

2012]

Volume 48, Issue 1

BEYOND RUGGIE’S GUIDING PRINCIPLES

37

activities of the 100 largest corporations have grown faster than those of nation
states, indicating their critical importance in the global economy.17 As if to
underscore the point, studies estimate that TNCs today make up one-third to onehalf of the world’s 100 largest economic entities.18 In the face of this economic might,
it seems reasonable that Howard V. Perlmutter, writing in the 1960s, called “the
senior executives engaged in building the geocentric enterprise . . . the most
important social architects of the last third of the twentieth century. For the
institution they are trying to erect promises a greater universal sharing of wealth and
a consequent control of the explosive centrifugal tendencies of our evolving world
community.”19
Despite its 1960s sanguinity—and putting aside that the phrase “geocentric
enterprise” conjures up a discarded script from Mad Men (CEO of Minerals R Us:
“We need some creative ideas for cleaning up our shabby corporate image.” Sterling
Cooper Copywriter: “How does ‘geocentric enterprise’ grab you?”)—Perlmutter’s
vision evidences that even early in their modern development, TNCs, for better or
worse, exhibited a powerful potential capable of displacing the ability of government
to exert influence over their actions.20 If anything, the last fifty years have made it
clear that states no longer hold a monopoly on manipulating the international
system, and moreover, that corporate and state interests are not necessarily always
simpatico.21 Indeed, much like states, many TNCs today “have the resources and
power both to perpetrate and to escape responsibility” for human rights abuses.22
Partly because of this unfolding new reality, a parallel rising emphasis on
greater accountability now confronts these corporate actors. As writer Charles
Handy has observed:
If we haven’t bothered much about these things in the past, it is probably
because we never thought of businesses as political institutions, but rather
as engines and instruments of commerce, as machines not communities.
We did not, therefore, apply the same rules to them as we would to a
17. Press Release, U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, Are Transnationals Bigger than
Countries?, U.N. Press Release TAD/INF/PR/47 (Aug. 12, 2002) [hereinafter UNCTAD Press Release];
see also SARAH ANDERSON & JOHN CAVANAGH, INSTITUTE FOR POLICY STUDIES, TOP 200: THE RISE
OF CORPORATE GLOBAL POWER i (2000) (“The Top 200 corporations’ sales are growing at a faster rate
than overall global economic activity. Between 1983 and 1999, their combined sales grew from the
equivalent of 25.0 percent to 27.5 percent of World GDP.”).
18. UNCTAD Press Release, supra note 17.
19. Perlmutter, supra note 10, at 18. According to Perlmutter, the geocentric enterprise offered “an
institutional and supra-national framework which could conceivably make war less likely, on the
assumption that bombing customers, suppliers and employees is in nobody’s interest.” Id.
20. Vernon, supra note 9, at 27.
21. Whereas the bottom line for many TNCs is maximizing share price, nation-states ideally seek to
improve material welfare as a whole while keeping the peace. See Celia Wells & Juanita Elias, Catching
the Conscience of the King: Corporate Players on the International Stage, in NON-STATE ACTORS AND
HUMAN RIGHTS 141, 145–50 (Philip Alston ed., 2005) (comparing the traditional role of international law
in a “state-centric” system, where the motivation is the protection of citizens, to the altered role of
international law where the state sovereignty is challenged by MNCs interested in low production costs
effectuated by minimal human rights standards).
22. Id. at 142; see also Claudio Grossman & Daniel D. Bradlow, Are We Being Propelled Towards A
People-Centered Transnational Legal Order?, 9 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 1, 8 (1993) (“The fact that they
have multiple production facilities means that TNCs can evade state power and the constraints of national
regulatory schemes.”).
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nation-state, where matters of human rights, free speech and the
responsibility of governors to the governed would be argued about and
even fought over.23
B. International Human Rights Law: From Humble, Non-binding Beginnings
The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) is often credited as
the first modern acknowledgment on the part of states that international law can in
fact serve as a source of rights and responsibilities for individual as well as state
actors.24 While the United Nations (U.N.) General Assembly voted unanimously to
endorse the UDHR, it did so with the express understanding that its content
constituted an aspirational statement of human rights principles, rather than a
binding treaty capable of establishing legally enforceable obligations on the part of
states.25 In the words of Eleanor Roosevelt, chairperson of the international
commission responsible for drafting the UDHR, it “was not a treaty or international
agreement and did not impose legal obligations; it was rather a statement of basic
principles of inalienable human rights setting up a common standard of achievement
for all peoples and all nations.”26
Despite the seemingly constrained ambition of the UDHR, binding
international law has a funny way of being created out of the customary (distinct
from contractual or treaty) practices of states, provided that such practices are
readily identifiable as being widespread, consistent, and motivated by a sense of legal
obligation.27 And this is precisely what has transpired in the case of the rights
expressed in the UDHR. Soon after the UDHR’s passage, the International Court
of Justice reasoned that its provisions reflected guiding principles of law and basic
tenets of humanity.28 By the 1970s, evolving state practice allowed the renowned
international law scholar Ian Brownlie to acknowledge that “the indirect legal effect
of the Declaration is not to be underestimated and it is frequently regarded as a part
of the ‘law of the United Nations.’”29 Closer to home, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit in 1980 observed that the prohibition against torture

23. Charles Handy, The World in 1997: Will Your Company Become a Democracy?, ECONOMIST,
Jan. 10, 2011, available at http://www.economist.com/node/17878558.
24. Margaret R. Somers & Christopher N.J. Roberts, Toward a New Sociology of Rights: A
Genealogy of “Buried Bodies” of Citizenship and Human Rights, 4 ANN. REV. L. SOC. SCI. 385, 391 (2008)
(quoting JUDITH BLAU & ALBERTO MONCADA, HUMAN RIGHTS: BEYOND THE LIBERAL VISION 33
(M.D. Lanham ed., 2005)) (The UDHR is “today recognized as perhaps the ‘fundamental source of
inspiration for international efforts to promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms, and
. . . the canonical reference for all other human rights instruments.’”).
25. See The Foundation of International Human Rights, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/en/
documents/udhr/hr_law.shtml (last visited June 24, 2012) (noting that the UDHR was originally a
commitment to upholding dignity and justice that was slowly translated into law over the years).
26. 1948 U.N.Y.B. 527, U.N. Sales No. 1950.I.II [hereinafter U.N.Y.B.]; History of the Document,
UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/history.shtml (last visited June 24, 2012).
27. See Corfu Channel Case (U.K. and N. Ir. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, at 22 (Apr. 9) (“Such obligations
are based, not on the Hague Convention of 1907 . . . but on certain general and well-recognized principles,
namely: elementary considerations of humanity, even more exacting in peace than in war; the principle of
the freedom of maritime communication; and every State's obligation not to allow knowingly its territory
to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States.”).
28. Id.
29. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 559 (7th ed. 2008).
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had “become part of customary international law, as evidenced and defined by the
[UDHR].”30
In an even broader recognition of this unfolding process, others have concluded
that many of the UDHR’s provisions “have become incorporated into customary
international law, which is binding on all states.”31 The U.N. itself confirmed this
evolutionary process on the occasion of the UDHR’s 60th anniversary, when it
recognized that the document’s aspirational commitment
[o]ver the years . . . has been translated into law, whether in the forms of
treaties, customary international law, general principles, regional
agreements and domestic law, through which human rights are expressed
and guaranteed.
Indeed, the UDHR has inspired more than 80
international human rights treaties and declarations, a great number of
regional human rights conventions, domestic human rights bills, and
constitutional provisions, which together constitute a comprehensive
legally binding system for the promotion and protection of human rights.32
Ultimately, the UDHR was only the opening salvo in the rapid development of
a binding system of international human rights law that continues to expand and
entrench itself today in international, regional, and domestic contexts. Beginning
with the lynchpin covenants governing both civil and political rights and economic,
social, and cultural rights33 (together with the UDHR, sometimes referred to as the
International Bill of Human Rights), the international community has drafted and
ratified a total of nine core international human rights treaties, with the most
recent—addressing enforced disappearance—entering into force at the end of 2010.34
Among other things, these regimes require state reporting on implementation and
establish committees of independent experts responsible for engaging with state
parties and providing authoritative interpretations of treaty provisions.35

30. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 882 (2d Cir. 1980).
31. Hurst Hannum, The UDHR In National and International Law, 3 HEALTH & HUM. RTS. 144, 145
(1998).
NATIONS,
32. The
Foundation
of
International
Human
Rights
Law,
UNITED
http://www.un.org/events/humanrights/2008/ihrl.shtml (last visited June 21, 2012).
33. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [ICCPR], G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N.
Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966) (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976); International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights [ICESCR], G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966) (entered
into force Jan. 3, 1976).
34. Human Rights Treaty Bodies, OFF. U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER HUM. RTS.,
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/treaty/index.htm (last visited June 22, 2012). In addition to the
International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (CPED) and
the covenants noted above (ICCPR and ICESR), the core treaties consist of the following: The
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) (1965); the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) (1979); the
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment (CAT) (1984); the
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) (1989); the International Convention on the Protection of
the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (ICRMW) (1990); and the Convention
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) (2006). See International Law, OFF. U.N. HIGH
COMMISSIONER HUM. RTS., http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/index.htm (last visited June 24, 2012)
(providing a list and links to the full text of the core international human rights instruments).
35. Human Rights Treaty Bodies, supra note 34.
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Even more profoundly, the European regional human rights system has
established a judicial mechanism empowered to hear individual complaints filed
against state parties and issue binding judgments. Within this framework, the
European Court of Human Rights serves as the final “supranational” court of appeal
on matters relating to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms—a treaty premised on “tak[ing] the first steps for the
collective enforcement of certain of the rights stated in the [UDHR].”36 Similar
efforts and systems have evolved in other geographic regions including the Americas
and Africa with varying degrees of success.37
Finally, in the domestic context, the promise of the UDHR has informed the
drafting of national constitutions and served as a touchstone for defining human
rights protections for over half a century.38 In this regard, its influence has been
broad and far-reaching, coloring the constitutional outcomes in a diverse array of
countries, including New Zealand, Iraq, Afghanistan, South Africa, and all the states
of the former Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact, to name a few.39
From this brief survey, it becomes evident that the powerful logic, appeal, and
moral currency of human rights continues to gain ground, permeating virtually every
aspect of our lives, from the global to the local. Human rights have served as the
rallying cry for “Arab Spring” protestors braving confrontation with their
governments in the streets,40 and violations of these rights have provided the basis for
the International Criminal Court’s indictment against the now-deceased Libyan
strongman Muammar Gaddafi.41 In a parallel development, the human rights
discourse—long considered applicable only to the relationship between governments
and the governed—is increasingly being invoked as a reference point for
relationships between individuals and corporate actors. For example, the 1979
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
(CEDAW) foreshadowed this spillover effect by requiring state parties inter alia
“[t]o take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women by any
person, organization or enterprise” (emphasis added).42 To gauge how far-reaching
and all-permeating this phenomenon has become, consider that all of the following
have potential human rights implications: the coffee you drink,43 the clothing you

36. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms pmbl.,
opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. No. 005 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953).
37. See Dinah Shelton, International Human Rights Law: Principled, Double, or Absent Standards, 25
LAW & INEQ. 467, 476–79 (2007) (discussing the UDHR and subsequent human rights treaties in the
Americas); Nsongurua J. Udombana, Mission Accomplished? An Impact Assessment of the UDHR in
Africa, 30 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 335, 336–38 (2008) (noting the impact of the UDHR on
organizational efforts in Africa to improve human rights and their effectiveness).
38. A.E. Dick Howard, A Traveler from an Antique Land: The Modern Renaissance of Comparative
Constitutionalism, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 3, 18 (2009).
39. Robert C. Blitt, Should New Bills of Rights Address Emerging International Human Rights
Norms? The Challenge of ‘Defamation of Religion,’ 9 NW. U. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 1, 2 (2010).
40. Shadi Mokhtari, The Middle East and Human Rights: Inroads Towards Charting Its Own Path, 10
NW. U. J. INT'L HUM. RTS. 194, 195 (2012).
41. Prosecutor v. Muammar Mohammed Abu Minyar Gaddafi, Case No. ICC-01/11, Warrant of
Arrest, para. 3 (June 27, 2011), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1099321.pdf.
42. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women art. 2(e), G.A.
Res. 34/180, U.N. Doc. A/RES/34/46 (Sept. 3, 1981) [hereinafter CEDAW].
43. See As the Global Coffee Crisis Worsens, a Human Rights Organization Launches a Grassroots
Campaign Demanding that Folgers Start Offering Fair Trade Coffee, DEMOCRACY NOW (Dec. 24, 2001),
http://www.democracynow.org/2001/12/24/as_the_global_coffee_crisis_worsens (discussing the global crisis
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wear,44 your Internet search results,45 the computer you buy,46 and the diamonds
encrusting the whip Lady Gaga reportedly presented Beyoncé for her 29th birthday.47
Thus, the story of the UDHR is the story of how aspirational non-binding
principles, or “soft law,” can evolve continually over time into more durable and
enforceable “hard law”—either in the form of a written treaty or in the consolidation
of customary international practice. As I argue below, this is the most important
lesson for corporate counsel to internalize when contemplating the evolving
relationship between business and human rights. Put simply, although SRSG
Ruggie’s freshly minted Guiding Principles might strike one as plainly non-binding
and aspirational today, these same principles can and will find surreptitious ways of
growing up and becoming enforceable international norms that may carry serious
repercussions for corporations, officers, and ill-prepared shareholders.

created by the collapse in coffee prices and human rights campaigns demanding free trade coffee); see also
Sarah Lyon, Fair Trade Coffee and Human Rights in Guatemala, 30 J. CONSUMER POL’Y 241, 242–43
(2007) (arguing that “fair trade consumption plays an important role in the realization of human rights”);
Global Human Rights Statement, STARBUCKS COFFEE CO., 1, http://assets.starbucks.com/assets/
1d7de46ff5f845d89c01a81bebdbdb59.pdf (last visited July 25, 2012) (manifesting Starbuck’s desire to
“uphold the provision of basic human rights and to eliminate discriminatory practices”).
44. See Kathy Marks, Exposed: The Reality Behind London's 'Ethical' Olympics, THE INDEPENDENT
(Apr. 14, 2012), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/exposed-the-reality-behind-londonsethical-olympics-7644013.html (discussing allegations of widespread violations of workers' rights in
Indonesian factories contracted to manufacture Olympics apparel for Adidas).
45. See Amy Schatz, Web Firms Under Fire to Protect Human Rights, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 2, 2010),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704548604575097603307733826.html (discussing Google’s
decision to “stop censoring search results in China after the company’s servers came under a cyber-attack
there”); David Drummond, A New Approach to China: An Update, Mar. 22, 2010, OFFICIAL GOOGLE
BLOG (Mar. 22, 2010, 2:03 PM), http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2010/03/new-approach-to-chinaupdate.html (explaining Google’s attempt to balance the demands of the Chinese government and
resultant cyber-attacks on human rights activists with the company’s desire to offer uncensored search
results). Shortly after Google transferred its service to Hong Kong as a result of these cyber attacks,
Microsoft willingly stepped in to strike a deal with Baidu, China’s leading search provider, wherein it
would supply the Chinese company with censored web search services in English. Matt Warman,
Microsoft Bing in Search Deal with China’s Baidu, TELEGRAPH (July 4, 2011, 5:09 PM),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/microsoft/8616260/Microsoft-Bing-in-search-deal-with-ChinasBaidu.html.
46. See Fair Labor Association Begins Inspections of Foxconn, APPLE (Feb. 13, 2012, 3:32 PM),
http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2012/02/13Fair-Labor-Association-Begins-Inspections-of-Foxconn.html
(discussing Apple’s decision to allow voluntary audits of its factories by the Fair Labor Association).
47. Whip, Whip Hooray, THE SUN (Sept. 7, 2010) http://www.thesun.co.uk/sol/homepage/showbiz/
bizarre/3127396/Cracking-birthday-present-for-Beyonce-from-GaGa-pal.html. The author hazards a guess
that Gaga did not insist that the diamonds be certified conflict-free. Information about conflict diamonds
is available at Conflict Diamonds: Sanctions and War, U.N. DEP’T PUB. INFO. (Mar. 21, 2001),
http://www.un.org/peace/africa/Diamond.html. For information on the Kimberley Process diamond
certification system, see KIMBERLEY PROCESS, http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/home/index_en.html
(last visited June 30, 2012) (“The Kimberley Process (KP) is a joint government, industry and civil society
initiative to stem the flow of conflict diamonds—rough diamonds used by rebel movements to finance
wars against legitimate governments.”). Critics debate whether or not the definition of a conflict diamond
should be expanded. See, e.g., Sandra Nyaira, Kimberley Process Meeting Ends Without Consensus on
Zimbabwe Diamonds, VOICE AM. (June 23, 2011), http://www.voanews.com/zimbabwe/news/KimberleyProcess-Meeting-Ends-Without-Consensus-on-Zimbabwe-124439624.html (reporting on disagreements
during a recent meeting regarding Zimbabwe conflict diamonds).
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II. CORPORATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS LIABILITY—A WORK IN
PROGRESS
A. Overview
A rich and expansive literature debating the theoretical and practical
implications of ascribing liability for human rights violations to corporate entities has
emerged during the past twenty years.48 However, the following section is concerned
primarily with SRSG Ruggie’s 2011 report to the U.N. Human Rights Council
(H.R.C.), which sets out guiding principles for addressing the relationship between
business and human rights. The justification for this narrow focus flows from the fact
that Ruggie’s effort, encompassing a lengthy and inclusive consultation process, has
garnered U.N. endorsement and therefore stands as the most internationally
authoritative statement in this area. Despite this pedigree—or perhaps because of
it—the Ruggie report has also gained its share of detractors, as will be discussed
below.
The SRSG’s appointment dates back to 2005,49 following a contentious and
ultimately unsuccessful first attempt by a separate U.N. initiative to establish TNC
human rights obligations along the same baseline as is applicable to states.50 After
concluding that little in the way of consistent standards or practices governed TNCs
in this area, the SRSG in 2008 recommended a three-pillar framework for improving
the existing fragmentary and inconsistent approach: “Protect, Respect and
Remedy.”51 In summary, this framework calls for:
Preserving “the [S]tate duty to protect against human rights abuses by
third parties, including business enterprises, through appropriate policies,
regulation, and adjudication.”
48. See, e.g., Anthony D’Amato, Are Human Rights Good For International Business?, 1 NW. J. INT’L
L. & BUS. 22, 24 (1979) (discussing possible inconsistencies between multinational investments and human
rights); Diane F. Orentlicher & Timothy A. Gelatt, Public Law, Private Actors: The Impact of Human
Rights on Business Investors in China, 14 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 66, 68 (1993) (positing that businesses
investing in China are responsible for ensuring that their actions do not “contribute to the systematic
denial of human rights”); HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS AND THE RESPONSIBILITY OF TRANSNATIONAL
CORPORATIONS 32–34 (Michael K. Addo ed., 1999) (attempting to define a framework for transnational
corporate responsibility for human rights through a collection of essays, which were presented at the
University of Exeter); Beth Stephens, The Amorality of Profit: Transnational Corporations and Human
Rights, 20 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 45, 48 (2002) (addressing the uncontrolled human rights danger
multinationals pose as analyzed in light of the Holocaust and other modern events); TRANSNATIONAL
CORPORATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 28 (Jedrzej George Frynas & Scott Pegg eds., 2003) (“In both
practical and academic terms, the issues surrounding TNCs and human rights are fast proving themselves
to be a growth market for the twenty-first century.”); Peter Muchlinski, Social and Human Rights
Implications of TNC Activities in the Extractive Industries, 18 TRANSNAT’L CORPS. 125, 125 (2009)
(discussing human rights violations linked to TNCs as they occur in the extractive industries). For
additional reading, see generally Getting Started Portal, BUS. & HUM. RTS. RESOURCE CENTRE,
http://www.business-humanrights.org/GettingStartedPortal/15reports (last visited July 7, 2012) (providing
links to various resources on business and human rights).
49. Emeka Duruigbo, Corporate Accountability and Liability for International Human Rights Abuses:
Recent Changes and Recurring Challenges, 6 NW. U. J. INT'L HUM. RTS. 222, 242 (2008).
50. Id.; U.N. ESCOR, Comm’n on Hum. Rts., Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: Norms on the
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human
Rights, pmbl., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (Aug. 26, 2003).
51. Guiding Principles, supra note 3, at 3–4.
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Requiring corporate respect for human rights under a due diligence
standard intended to avoid “infringing on the rights of others and to
address adverse impacts” involving the TNC; and
Enhancing “access by victims [of human rights violations] to effective
remedy, both judicial and non-judicial.”52
With a renewed mandate from the H.R.C., Ruggie moved to “operationalize”
this framework by developing concrete and practical recommendations which he
ultimately set forth in his March 2011 report, Guiding Principles on Business and
Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy”
Framework.53 Shortly thereafter, the H.R.C. unanimously endorsed Ruggie’s report
and moved to establish a working group dedicated, inter alia, to “effective and
comprehensive dissemination and implementation of the Guiding Principles.”54
B. The 2011 Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing
the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework
1.

Key Parameters

There are two things the SRSG’s Guiding Principles do not accomplish. First,
as is evident from the title, the principles do not aspire to create binding international
law or impose obligations on TNCs. Rather, its “normative contribution lies . . . in
elaborating the implications of existing standards and practices for States and
businesses; integrating them within a single, logically coherent and comprehensive
template; and identifying where the current regime falls short and how it should be
improved.”55 Similarly, the Guiding Principles do not offer a plug-and-play “tool kit”
for identifying corporate human rights responsibilities. Instead, they proffer a
sliding-scale approach for corporations based on their size and, ostensibly, their
location.56
In the words of the report, “When it comes to means for
implementation . . . one size does not fit all.”57
Inherent in the SRSG’s approach is a rejection—to the relief of many corporate
boardrooms—of what he labels the “advocacy community’s” attempt “to lay on
business itself all manner of responsibility for social outcomes.”58 The purpose,
therefore, of the Guiding Principles is to “clearly differentiate the respective roles of
52. Id. at 4.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 3; Human Rights Council Res. 17/4, Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and
Other Business Enterprises, 17th Sess., June 16, 2011, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/L.17/Rev.1, para. 6(a) (July 6,
2011).
55. Guiding Principles, supra note 3, at 5. Here it is worth recalling Mrs. Roosevelt’s statement to
delegates concerning the UDHR. U.N.Y.B., supra note 26, at 527.
56. See Guiding Principles, supra note 3, at 5 (“While the Principles themselves are universally
applicable, the means by which they are realized will reflect the fact that we live in a world of 192 United
Nations Member States, 80,000 transnational enterprises, 10 times as many subsidiaries and countless
millions of national firms, most of which are small and medium-sized enterprises.”).
57. Id.
58. OECD, Prof. John Ruggie on Businesses and Human Rights, YOUTUBE (Dec. 10, 2010),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dVDupBFJiqE.
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businesses and governments and make sure that they both play those roles.”59 In
other words, while government retains the exclusive responsibility for protecting and
fulfilling human rights obligations, the litmus test for corporations under the Guiding
Principles only inquires whether business enterprises respect human rights.60
According to international law, the duty to respect requires that actors “refrain
from interfering directly or indirectly with the enjoyment” of human rights.61 This
“entails the prohibition of certain acts . . . that may undermine the enjoyment of
rights.”62 Put more succinctly, it obligates actors “not to commit violations
themselves.”63 However, under the Guiding Principles, a further key distinction is
drawn between obligation and responsibility. The responsibility to respect human
rights “means that business enterprises should act with due diligence to avoid
infringing on the rights of others and to address adverse impacts with which they are
involved.”64 Yet the term responsibility, as opposed to duty or obligation, is intended
to indicate “that respecting rights is not currently an obligation that international
human rights law generally imposes directly on companies, although elements of it
may be reflected in domestic laws.”65
With these clarifications, we are still left with an outstanding question: Are the
Guiding Principles informed by a broad or narrow interpretation of human rights?
The text of Guiding Principle 12 suggests the latter approach by framing
“internationally recognized human rights . . . at a minimum, as those expressed in the
International Bill of Human Rights [IBHR] and the principles concerning

59. Id.
60. Guiding Principles, supra note 3, at 13. To a lesser extent, the Guiding Principles also address
certain responsibilities relating to remedying human rights violations. See id. at 22–27 (discussing various
judicial, administrative, legislative, and other appropriate mechanisms for providing effective remedies
when business-related human rights abuses occur).
61. Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, Substantive Issues Arising in the Implementation of the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: General Comment No. 15 (2002): The
Right to Water (Arts. 11 and 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights),
Nov. 11–29, 2002, para. 21, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2002/11, ESCOR, 29th Sess. (Jan. 20, 2003). This is also
referred to as a negative obligation since it informs states of what they must not do. JEAN-FRANCOIS
AKANDJI-KOMBE, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, HUMAN RIGHTS HANDBOOK NO. 7, POSITIVE OBLIGATIONS
UNDER THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS: A GUIDE TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 11 (2007), available at http://echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/
1B521F61-A636-43F5-AD56-5F26D46A4F55/0/DG2ENHRHAND072007.pdf.
Positive obligations
require actors to take action. Id. The duty to respect typically comes alongside the obligation to protect
against human rights abuses and the obligation to fulfill basic human rights. International Human Rights
Law, OFF. U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER HUM. RTS., http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/Pages/
InternationalLaw.aspx (last visited July 7, 2012).
62. MANFRED NOWAK, OFFICE OF THE U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, NO. 8,
HUMAN RIGHTS HANDBOOK FOR PARLIAMENTARIANS 11 (2005). For example, with regard to
education, governments are prohibited from impinging upon the liberty of parents “to establish private
schools and to ensure the religious and moral education of their children in accordance with their own
convictions.” Id.
63. AKANDJI-KOMBE, supra note 61, at 5.
64. Guiding Principles, supra note 3, at 4.
65. John Ruggie, U.N. Special Representative for the Sec’y Gen. for Bus. & Human Rights, The U.N.
“Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework for Business and Human Rights, 2 (Sept. 2010) [hereinafter
Framework for Business and Human Rights]. The plain meaning of “responsibility” suggests a moral
obligation to behave correctly or a thing that one is required to do, rather than a duty to which an actor is
legally bound. OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS, OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 577 (1980). Although the
final Guiding Principles do not provide explicit recognition that “responsibility” is distinct from “duty” or
“obligation,” the difference is implied insofar as the term duty is invoked in regard to states only.
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fundamental rights set out in the International Labour Organization’s [ILO]
Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work.”66 From this wording,
the Guiding Principles create the appearance of a baseline that leaves open to debate
the larger spectrum of recognized rights, including, for example, norms established
under CEDAW and CPMW67—to name but two international treaties that may have
immediate particular relevance to corporate practices.
Consideration of the Commentary accompanying Guiding Principle 12 goes
some way towards alleviating the issue of which rights are to be respected. For
example, it rightly acknowledges “business enterprises can have an impact on
virtually the entire spectrum of internationally recognized human rights.”68 It also
provides that, “[d]epending on circumstances, business enterprises may need to
consider additional standards.”69 However, several concerns still persist with this
formulation. First, it devalues the international community’s ongoing commitment
to elaborating a normative rights framework beyond the IBHR, as manifested in the
entry into force of no fewer than seven additional “core international human rights
treaties.”70 Part of the motivation for this ongoing endeavor may be attributed to the
inadequate explication of norms as well as inattention to specific issues under the
IBHR. For example, as the preamble to CEDAW acknowledges, “despite [the
IBHR] extensive discrimination against women continues to exist.”71 Core treaties
such as CEDAW represent “the product of more than half a century of continuous
elaboration” of human rights norms and “set international standards for the
protection and promotion” of these norms.72 Relegating reference to these core
treaties to the Commentary of Guiding Principle 12 does this hard fought
international effort a disservice by implying the divisibility of rights and downplaying
the trend towards greater international scrutiny of private actors, including potential
liability where recognized rights are harmed.73
Second, Guiding Principle 12, at least in part, sources its human rights norms in
the ILO’s Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, a document
that emphasizes principles and rights relating to “(a) freedom of association and

66. Guiding Principles, supra note 3, at 13. The Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at
Work, adopted by the ILO in 1988, “is an expression of commitment by governments, employers’ and
workers’ organizations to uphold basic human values . . . vital to our social and economic lives.” ILO
Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, INT’L LABOUR ORG.,
http://www.ilo.org/declaration/lang--en/index.htm (last visited June 22, 2012).
67. See Blitt, supra note 39, at 2–3 (discussing the debate between whether established international
standards represent “the normative ceiling or only the floor”); International Law, supra note 34
(introducing CEDAW and CMPW).
68. Guiding Principles, supra note 3, at 13.
69. Id. at 14.
70. This term is an intentional one used by the United Nations and others to encapsulate the primary
international human rights treaties. See, e.g., International Law, supra note 34 (listing the “nine core
international human rights treaties”).
71. CEDAW, supra note 42, pmbl.
72. OFFICE OF THE U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, FACT SHEET NO. 30, THE UNITED
NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY SYSTEM: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CORE HUMAN RIGHTS
TREATIES AND THE TREATY BODIES 7, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/docs/OHCHR-Fact
Sheet30.pdf (last visited July 15, 2012).
73. See JERNEJ CERNIC, HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND BUSINESS: CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR
FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS 97 (2010) (“The core international human rights treaties explicitly and
implicitly refer to state human rights obligations of states in relation to corporate conduct.”).
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effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining; (b) the elimination of . . .
forced or compulsory labour; (c) the abolition of child labour; and (d) the elimination
of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation.”74 Although the
declaration’s relevance in the context of corporate responsibility is understandable,
its non-binding status necessarily renders it a less authoritative source of law than the
core treaties. Indeed, the decision to invoke the declaration within the text of the
Guiding Principle ultimately comes at the expense of forgoing explicit reference to
the core international treaties that establish a broader range of compulsory norms
beyond the declaration’s narrow focus. Citing the declaration as a source of
minimum-recognized human rights norms is also curious insofar as the declaration
has fewer parties than some of the core international human rights treaties, including
the CRC and CEDAW,75 and offers fewer formalized tools for meaningful review,
engagement, and enforcement.76
Finally, referencing “additional standards” in the Commentary to the Guiding
Principles presumes that decision makers within the corporate community—and
potentially judicial and arbitral forums down the road—will be prepared to give
weight to this supplemental source as a tool for elucidating the full scope and intent
of the Guiding Principles. Examining international norms and practices that govern
treaty interpretation indicates that such an approach is by no means guaranteed. The
pacta sunt servanda, or good faith rule of treaty interpretation, “does not call for an
‘extensive’ or ‘liberal’ interpretation in the sense of an interpretation going beyond
what is expressed or necessarily to be implied in the terms of the treaty.”77 Similarly,
where the text of a given treaty is deemed sufficiently clear, interpretation rules shun
resorting to related travaux préparatoires including commentary for additional
guidance.78 Accessing the commentary—and the additional standards they may
reference—is thus contingent on a subjective finding that the language used “leaves
the meaning ambiguous or obscure.”79 Accordingly, in the immediate context of

74. ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and its Follow-up, INT’L LABOUR
ORG., http://www.ilo.org/declaration/thedeclaration/textdeclaration/lang--en/index.htm (last visited July 7,
2012).
75. The ILO declaration represents the views of the organization’s 183 member states. Tripartite
Constituents, INT’L LABOUR ORG., http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/who-we-are/tripartiteconstituents/lang--en/index.htm (last visited June 20, 2012). By way of comparison, the CRC and
CEDAW have 193 and 187 state parties respectively. Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res.
44/252, U.N. GOAR, 44th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/44/252 (Nov. 20, 1989); CEDAW, supra note 42.
76. According to the ILO, the declaration’s follow up mechanisms are essentially promotional. Rev.
of Ann. Rep. Under the Follow-up to the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at
Work, 310th Sess., Mar. 2011, at 1, I.L.O. Doc. GB.310/3 (2011). An annual review is required for those
states that have not ratified the ILO’s fundamental human rights conventions, and a Global Report on the
effect given to the promotion of the fundamental principles and rights at work is published to inform
ongoing ILO discussions. Id. In 2011, fifty-one states were subject to the annual review process. Id. at 2,
19. The ILO’s 2010 Resolution on the Follow-up to the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and
Rights at Work reiterates that its objective “is of a strictly promotional nature.” Id. at 31. In contrast, the
core international human rights treaties establish various opportunities for general comments and
recommendations that may impact obligations of private actors, including corporations and also allow for
decisions that address individual complaints where specific treaty obligations may have been violated.
CERNIC, supra note 73, at 98–99.
77. Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries, [1966] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 187, 219,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/191.
78. Id. at 222–23.
79. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 32(a), opened for signature May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force on Jan. 27, 1980).
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Guiding Principle 12, the term “at a minimum” may or may not trigger consideration
of preparatory work based on the discretionary finding of a given decision maker.80
Adopting a clearer, more authoritative and inclusive reference to the core
international human rights treaties noted above could easily avert this potentially
uncertain outcome. Unlike the halting standard promulgated under Guiding
Principle 12, a more robust reference to existing international human rights
standards would more effectively put corporations on notice regarding the full range
of scenarios under which a responsibility to respect might arise, better conform with
the international community’s approach to identifying and codifying human rights,
and generally reflect a more embracive and straightforward approach to corporate
human rights compliance.81
2.

Guiding Principles for Respecting Human Rights

With this curious framing of applicable international human rights in place, the
Guiding Principles urge business enterprises to respect human rights by
recommending that they:
(a) Avoid causing or contributing to adverse human rights impacts through
their own activities, and address such impacts when they occur; [and]
(b) Seek to prevent or mitigate adverse human rights impacts that are
directly linked to their operations, products or services by their business
relationships, even if they have not contributed to those impacts.82
To accomplish these objectives, an enterprise must have three basic mechanisms
in place: (1) a formal policy commitment to respect human rights approved at the
most senior level and reflected in operational policies and procedures; (2) “a human
rights due-diligence process to identify, prevent, mitigate and account for” businessrelated impacts on human rights; and (3) remediation processes to address any
“adverse [business-related] human rights impacts [the enterprises] cause or to which
they contribute.”83
With regard to the due-diligence mechanism, the Guiding Principles propose
that a business enterprise assess actual and potential human rights impacts it “may
cause or contribute to through its own activities, or which may be directly linked to its
operations, products or services by its business relationships” (emphasis added).84
This responsibility, according to the SRSG, should be “ongoing, recognizing that the
human rights risks may change over time as the business enterprise’s operations and
operating context evolve.”85 Moreover, to further validate the due-diligence process,
80. VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES: A COMMENTARY 584 (Oliver Dörr and
Kirsten Schmalenbach eds., 2012).
81. For example, invoking the core international human rights treaties in the Guiding Principles
proper would obviate the commentary’s need for providing an unwieldy definition for “core
internationally recognized human rights” that arguably underestimates the full panoply of rights contained
across the nine core treaties. Guiding Principles, supra note 3, at 13.
82. Id. at 14.
83. Id. at 15.
84. Id. at 16.
85. Id.
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the enterprise should rely on both internal and independent external expertise and
also take steps to meaningfully consult with relevant stakeholders and other
potentially affected groups.86
This seemingly far-reaching process is intended to identify and prevent certain
deleterious human rights impacts that may arise in a given business venture,
including those from associated business relationships or engagement with
vulnerable minority groups or populations.87
Accordingly, the due process
mechanism—like the other recommended mechanisms set forth under the Guiding
Principles—is envisioned to apply to all enterprises across the board. That said, a
determination of whether a given enterprise has satisfactorily complied with its
responsibilities is subject to a sliding scale that varies based on “size, sector,
operational context, ownership and structure,” as well as the magnitude of the
human rights impact in question.88 In other words, any human rights policy
commitment, due diligence process, or relevant remediation process is expected to be
more rigorous where the corporation is larger, a greater risk of a more severe human
rights impact appears, or additional national human rights obligations may be in play.
Conversely, smaller businesses that may be operating in less controversial areas are
subject to a less rigorous compliance standard under the Guiding Principles.
3.

Guiding Principles for Responding to Negative Human Rights Impacts

Once a business has an operational due diligence mechanism in place, the
Guiding Principles outline three specific responses corporations should take for
addressing adverse human rights impacts. First, where an enterprise “causes or may
cause an adverse impact, it should take the necessary steps to cease or prevent the
impact.”89 Second, where an enterprise contributes or may contribute to the harm, it
should act “to cease or prevent its contribution and use its leverage to mitigate any
remaining impact to the greatest extent possible.”90 In both instances, as part of
preventing, ceasing, or mitigating the harm, the Guiding Principles recommend
actively engaging in remediation, including the use of non-judicial “[o]perationallevel grievance mechanisms.”91
Finally, if a business enterprise does not cause or contribute to an adverse
human rights impact, but has its operations, products, or services directly linked to
another entity responsible for adverse human rights impacts, the situation, according
to the Guiding Principles, “is more complex.”92 To clarify the business enterprise’s
responsibilities under this third scenario, the SRSG identifies several variable factors
that will be relevant to the determining analysis, including “the enterprise’s leverage
over the entity concerned, how crucial the relationship is to the enterprise, the
severity of the abuse, and whether terminating the relationship with the entity itself
86. Guiding Principles, supra note 3, at 17.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 14.
89. Id. at 18.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 20. Over-reliance on non-judicial and corporate-controlled remediation tools has been the
target of some criticism by human rights groups. See infra notes 117–18 and accompanying text
(examining criticism by Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch regarding the Guiding
Principles’ failure to create an enforcement mechanism of its own).
92. Guiding Principles, supra note 3, at 18.
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would have adverse human rights consequences.”93 Regardless of which questions
are deemed relevant here, unlike the first two scenarios set out above, the Guiding
Principles do not impose a remediation responsibility in cases where the adverse
impact is merely directly linked to the business enterprise’s operations, products, or
services.94
The manner in which the Guiding Principles address the complexity of a
corporation being directly linked to harmful human rights impacts appears to weigh
heavily in favor of preserving the business enterprise’s economic interests. Indeed,
the scenario itself is premised on tacitly consenting to another actor causing or
contributing to an adverse human rights impact.95 Still, the Guiding Principles
caution that, at the end of the day, a decision by the business entity to preserve a
potentially deleterious relationship may come at a cost: “[A]s long as the abuse
continues and the enterprise remains in the relationship, it should be able to
demonstrate its own ongoing efforts to mitigate the impact and be prepared to accept
any consequences—reputational, financial or legal—of the continuing connection.”96
Additionally, the Guiding Principles urge that any corporate human rights impacts—
whether caused, contributed, or directly linked—be communicated publicly and at an
ongoing and sufficiently detailed level.97
4.

“Issues of Context”

The SRSG’s final comments regarding corporate respect for human rights are
provided under the vague heading “Issues of context.”98 Here, business enterprises
are urged “[i]n all contexts” to follow three rudimentary, if feebly drafted, golden
rules:
(a) Comply with all applicable laws and respect internationally recognized
human rights, wherever they operate;
(b) Seek ways to honour the principles of internationally recognized
human rights when faced with conflicting requirements;
(c) Treat the risk of causing or contributing to gross human rights abuses as
a legal compliance issue wherever they operate.99
The formulation of these basic tenets raises a number of questions. In the first
instance, should the Guiding Principles function to entrench a principled distinction
between “comply” and “respect?”100 By the same token, precisely what are “ways to

93. Id.
94. Id. at 20–21.
95. See id. at 19 (pointing out the possibility of situations in which the business has no leverage to
persuade a related entity to prevent or mitigate adverse impact, but is also not in a position to end the
relationship with that entity).
96. Id. at 19.
97. Id. at 20.
98. Guiding Principles, supra note 3, at 21.
99. Id.
100. As noted above, the Guiding Principles assert that even “respecting rights is not currently an
obligation that international human rights law generally imposes directly on companies.” Framework for
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honor” human rights principles and who will be responsible for defining them? Do
you honor human rights by acknowledging their existence in the business entity’s
annual report or by refusing to do business with a regime or business partner that
causes or condones human rights violations? Should a business be absolved of
human rights responsibility altogether where it operates within a state that is not in
compliance with international human rights norms? Faced with this latter scenario,
the Commentary on the Guiding Principles recommends that a corporation only
respect human rights “to the greatest extent possible in the circumstances.”101 This
ambiguous standard appears to invite a business-as-usual approach even in the face
of potentially appalling human rights outcomes, on the permissive basis that the
corporation can “demonstrate their efforts” to respect international human rights.102
Despite this relatively weak formulation, the Guiding Principles rightly caution
businesses operating in conflict-affected areas that any venture should be weighed
against the “the expanding web of potential corporate legal liability arising from
extraterritorial civil claims, and from the incorporation of the provisions of the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court in jurisdictions that provide for corporate
criminal responsibility.”103 Here, it is worth recalling that any prospective form of
corporate liability reinforces the existing rules concerning individual accountability
for human rights violations that still may befall corporate directors, officers, and
employees based on their actions.
C. Life After Ruggie’s Guiding Principles: Endorsement and Critique
1.

Endorsement

Reaction to the Guiding Principles has varied from enthusiastic endorsement to
vehement criticism. The U.N. H.R.C. has welcomed the SRSG’s findings and is
quickly moving to expand their relevancy as a touchstone for interactions between
businesses and human rights.104 Likewise, at its 2011 meeting, the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) rapidly took up and endorsed
the Guiding Principles.105 More concretely beyond statements of support, the OECD
overhauled its 2008 Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises by specifically
incorporating the SRSG’s Guiding Principles into a new chapter that for the first

Business and Human Rights, supra note 65, at 2. To what extent does this distinction entrench prior or
current practice rather than account for prospective changes that appear to be evolving through customary
international law or other sources of law?
101. Guiding Principles, supra note 3, at 21.
102. Imagine a situation in which a corporation refuses to hire or provide services to any individual
from a government-persecuted racial minority in the name of complying with domestic law and then
defends the practice by asserting that it acted to respect human rights “to the greatest extent possible in
the circumstances.” See id. (“[B]usiness enterprises are expected to respect the principles of
internationally recognized human rights to the greatest extent possible in the circumstances.”).
103. Id. at 21.
104. H.R.C. Res. 17/4, supra note 54, at 2.
105. OECD, OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 3 (2011), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/43/29/48004323.pdf [hereinafter OECD GUIDELINES]. Established in 1961,
the OECD is an intergovernmental organization dedicated to promoting policies to “improve the
economic and social well-being of people around the world.”
About OECD, OECD,
http://www.oecd.org/pages/0,3417,en_36734052_36734103_1_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited June 20, 2012).
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time addresses in a comprehensive manner business-related human rights concerns.106
U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton praised the revised OECD guidelines for their
potential to help governments “determine how supply chains can be changed so that
it [sic] can begin to prevent and eliminate abuses and violence. We’re going to look
at new strategies that will seek to make our case to companies that due diligence,
while not always easy, are [sic] absolutely essential.”107 As of June 2011, forty-two
states have committed to the OECD’s more robust standards,108 which are part of the
overarching 1976 OECD Declaration and Decisions on International Investment and
Multinational Enterprises.109
In a similar show of support, the European Commission “strongly welcome[d]”
the U.N. H.R.C.’s approval of the SRSG’s Guiding Principles on business and human
rights and noted that they would serve as “an important reference for the [European
Union’s] renewed policy on corporate social responsibility.”110 Finally, the U.N.
Global Compact, “the world’s largest corporate citizenship and sustainability
initiative,”111 has acknowledged the SRSG’s Guiding Principles as relevant inasmuch
as it provides “further operational clarity” for the Global Compact’s own
foundational human rights principles.112

106. OECD GUIDELINES, supra note 105, at 4.
107. Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary Clinton’s Remarks on the Commemoration of the 50th
Anniversary of the OECD on Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, HUMANRIGHTS.GOV (May 26,
2011), http://www.humanrights.gov/2011/05/26/secretary-clintons-remarks-on-the-commemoration-of-the50th-anniversary-of-the-oecd-on-guidelines-for-multinational-enterprises/.
108. This number represents all thirty-four OECD members as well as Argentina, Brazil, Egypt,
Latvia, Lithuania, Morocco, Peru, and Romania. New OECD Guidelines to Protect Human Rights and
Social Development, OECD (May 25, 2011), http://www.oecd.org/document/19/0,3746,en_
21571361_44315115_48029523_1_1_1_1,00.html.
109. The 1976 Declaration enshrines a policy commitment by government signatories to “improve the
investment climate; encourage the positive contribution multinational enterprises can make to economic
and social progress; [and] minimise and resolve difficulties which may arise from their operations.”
OECD Declaration and Decisions on International Investment and Multinational Enterprise, OECD,
http://www.oecd.org/document/24/0,3746,en_21571361_44315115_1875736_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited
June 21, 2012).
110. Business and Human Rights: New United Nations Guidelines, EUROPEAN COMMISSION (June
17, 2011), http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/newsroom/cf/itemdetail.cfm?item_id=5220.
111. U.N. Global Compact Participants, U.N. GLOBAL COMPACT (July 28, 2011),
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/ParticipantsAndStakeholders/index.html. The Global Compact’s board,
appointed and chaired by the U.N. Secretary-General, is the U.N.’s highest-level advisory body involving
the private sector.
Global Compact Governance, U.N. GLOBAL COMPACT (Apr. 30, 2011),
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/stages_of_development.html.
Its thirty-one members
comprise representatives of business, civil society, and international organizations. Id. For a critical
perspective on the Global Compact, see Graham Knight & Jackie Smith, The Global Compact and Its
Critics: Activism, Power Relations, and Corporate Social Responsibility, in DISCIPLINE AND PUNISHMENT
IN GLOBAL POLITICS: ILLUSIONS OF CONTROL (Janie Leatherman ed., 2008) (describing “how the
attempts to expand global CSR regimes through the UN Global Compact and the UN Norms for Business
have been limited in their ability to impact actual practices”).
112. The U.N. Protect, Respect and Remedy Framework for Business and Human Rights: Relationship
to
U.N.
Global
Compact
Commitments,
U.N.
GLOBAL
COMPACT
(May
2010),
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/issues_doc/human_rights/Resources/UNGC_SRSGBHR_Note.pdf
(emphasis omitted). “Principle 1 calls upon companies to respect and support the protection of
internationally proclaimed human rights; and Principle 2 calls upon them to ensure that they are not
complicit in human rights abuses.” Id.
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In addition to governmental and intergovernmental support, numerous
corporations have applauded the Guiding Principles for, among other things,
“clarify[ing] the distinct, interrelated roles and responsibilities of States and business
entities” and for helping to “operationalize . . . respective approaches to human
rights in a business context.”113 Reinforcing this favorable impression, investment
advisors and corporate lawyers alike have begun urging parties to adopt the Guiding
Principles. In a note to investors, one Swedish institutional investment advisor group
reasoned that U.N. approval of the principles lent them “authoritative status as the
global standard for preventing and addressing the risk of adverse impacts on human
rights linked to business activity.”114 Similarly, an Australian law firm has concluded
that the U.N. endorsement establishes the Guiding Principles as an
authoritative document for both States and business . . . . [I]t is likely that
they will have a significant influence on the domestic legal and policy
standards that will apply to business in the future . . . . [T]he Principles will
become the new standard for ‘best practice’ for business on human rights
internationally and the touchstone against which businesses will evaluate
their culture and response to human rights issues.115
2.

Critique

As laudatory as governments and businesses would appear to be, not everyone
has consumed the Kool-Aid of the Guiding Principles. Many leading human rights
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have publicly criticized the principles for
not going far enough to regulate the human rights impact of corporate actors. For
example, the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), an umbrella group
representing over 150 human rights groups around the world, has concluded that the
“road towards accountability is still a long way ahead” because the Guiding

113. Letter from Bob Corcoran, Vice President, Corporate Citizenship, General Electric, to Professor
John G. Ruggie, Special Representative of the Sec’y-General on the Issue of Human Rights and
Transnational Corps. (May 20, 2011), available at http://www.global-business-initiative.org/
SRSGpage/files/GE%20letter%20to%20John%20Ruggie.pdf; see also Letter from Richard Wong, Vice
President, Global Corporate Soc. Responsibility and Emp. Relations, Flextronics, to Professor John G.
Ruggie, Special Representative of the Sec’y-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational
Corps. (May 25, 2011), available at http://www.global-business-initiative.org/SRSGpage/files/
Letter%20to%20Ruggie%20110525%20flextronics.pdf (“writing to thank and commend” Ruggie for his
framework); Letter from Edward E. Potter, Dir., Global Workplace Rights, Coca-Cola, to Professor John
G. Ruggie, Special Representative of the Sec’y-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational
Corps. (May 26, 2011), available at http://www.global-business-initiative.org/SRSGpage/files/
Guiding%20Principles%20Endorsement%20from%20Coke.pdf (offering congratulations to Ruggie for
his framework on behalf of the Coca-Cola Company).
114. Gisela Riddarström, U.N. and OECD Guidelines Reinforce Expectations on Companies to
Respect Human Rights, ETHIX PRESS (June 28, 2011), http://www.ethix.se/content/ethix-press-un-andoecd-guidelines-reinforce-expectations-companies-respect-human-rights.
115. Focus: U.N. Endorses Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights, ALLENS (June 29,
2011), http://www.allens.com.au/pubs/ldr/focsrjun11_01.htm. Allens is “a major legal force in Asia.”
http://www.allens.com.au/about/index.htm (last visited June 21, 2012). See also U.N. Guiding Principles
for Business & Human Rights: Issuance of Ruggie Principles Portends Increasing Need for Multinational
Businesses to Focus on Human Rights Compliance, STEPTOE & JOHNSON LLP (Apr. 20, 2011),
http://www.steptoe.com/publications-newsletter-pdf.html/pdf/?item_id=172 (noting that “[w]hile the
Principles do not constitute ‘law,’ they will likely lead to increased human rights regulations”).
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Principles fail to ensure “the right to an effective remedy and the need for States’
measures to prevent abuses committed by their companies overseas.”116
Alongside FIDH, Human Rights Watch (HRW) and Amnesty International,
two of the largest and most influential international human rights NGOs, have
likewise taken a critical stance vis-à-vis the Guiding Principles. HRW blasted the
document for refusing to establish a “global standard” for corporate responsibility
and opting instead in favor of a sliding scale based on business size and geographic
location.117
The NGO further accused the U.N. H.R.C. of disregarding
recommendations by dozens of civil society groups, blaming the body for
“squander[ing] an opportunity” to establish a mechanism that would ensure the
Guiding Principles are actually “put into practice.”118 According to HRW, the U.N.
H.R.C.’s endorsement of the Guiding Principles amounted to nothing more than an
“endorse[ment] [of] the status quo: a world where companies are encouraged, but
not obliged, to respect human rights.”119
In a similar manner, Amnesty International criticized the Guiding Principles’
failure to adequately address key corporate accountability issues and suggested
mandating rather than only recommending a due diligence approach, effectively
preventing and punishing extraterritorial human rights abuses, and explicitly
recognizing the right to a judicial remedy as a human right.120 Amnesty also took aim
at the U.N. H.R.C. for failing to empower its newly established Working Group on
the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business
enterprises with the ability to weigh and assess the implementation and effectiveness
of the “protect, respect and remedy” framework and the Guiding Principles.
According to Amnesty International, without a stronger mandate, the Working
Group would be unable to “to take proactive steps to tackle the need for greater
clarity and increased legal protections. If not corrected, this will be a missed
opportunity.”121 Indeed, the U.N. H.R.C. resolution endorsing the Guiding Principles
omits any mention of the term “legal” or any reference to the potential for a future

116. U.N. Human Rights Council Adopts Guiding Principles on Business Conduct, yet Victims Still
Waiting for Effective Remedies, FIDH (June 17, 2011), http://www.fidh.org/UN-Human-Rights-Counciladopts-Guiding-Principles. A more detailed analysis of the shortcomings in the draft Guiding Principles
signed by over 120 NGOs is available at Joint Civil Society Statement on the Draft Guiding Principles on
Business and Human Rights, FIDH (Mar. 3, 2011), http://www.fidh.org/Joint-Civil-Society-Statement-onthe-draft,9066. Another statement released by a coalition of over fifty NGOs in advance of the June 2011
U.N. H.R.C. meeting is available at Joint Civil Society Statement: Advancing the Global Business and
Human Rights Agenda: Follow-up to the Work of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General
(SRSG) on Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, CTR. FOR
ECON. AND SOC. RTS. (May 2011), http://www.cesr.org/downloads/Joint-civil-society-statement-onbusiness-and-human-rights-May-2011_1.pdf.
117. U.N. Human Rights Council: Weak Stance on Business Standards, HUM. RTS. WATCH (June 16,
2011), http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2011/06/16/un-human-rights-council-weak-stance-business-standards.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Public Statement, United Nations: A Call for Action to Better Protect the Rights of Those
Affected by Business-Related Human Rights Abuses, AMNESTY INT’L 2 n. 4 (June 14, 2011),
http://www.amnesty.org/ar/library/asset/IOR40/009/2011/en/0ba488bd-8ba2-4b59-8d1f-eb75ad9f3b84/
ior400092011en.pdf.
121. Id. at 3.
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international instrument that would hold corporations accountable for human rights
violations.122
The Child Rights Information Network (CRIN), a UK-based NGO dedicated to
the promotion of children’s rights, has also sternly rebuked the SRSG’s final report:
It is with great disappointment that we see no . . . substantive discussion of
the rights particular to children that have long been a matter of
international law. . . . ‘[I]t is difficult to imagine th[e Guiding Principles]
could provide any meaningful guidance for States and business enterprises
seeking to ‘protect, respect and remedy’ the human rights of children.’123
This omission is especially troubling because the SRSG’s mandate, inter alia,
required giving “special attention to persons belonging to vulnerable groups, in
particular children.”124 However, this shortcoming may potentially be remedied
through the new U.N. Working Group’s mandate, which does preserve an emphasis
on continuing to “integrate a gender perspective throughout [its] work . . . and to
give special attention to persons living in vulnerable situations, in particular
children.”125
Although the process that led to the adoption of the Guiding Principles is
unlikely to be impugned for a lack of transparency or collaboration, the SRSG has
not responded to the substantive allegations set out above,126 many of which relate
back to the desire to seek greater accountability for corporate action that may cause
or facilitate human rights violations. Accordingly, from a human rights standpoint,
the key stumbling block moving forward remains convincing state and corporate
actors of the need for legally binding and enforceable international norms capable of
effectively regulating business conduct wherever human rights concerns may arise.127
122. H.R.C. Res. 17/4, supra note 54.
123. Business and Human Rights: CRIN Response to Adoption of the Guiding Principles, CRIN
(June 21, 2011), http://www.crin.org/resources/infodetail.asp?id=25245. Ruggie’s final report does allude
to the 2007 Paris Principles and Guidelines on Children Associated with Armed Forces or Armed Groups.
Guiding Principles, supra note 3, at 8–9. However, it explicitly excludes the provisions of the Convention
on the Rights of the Child from the “authoritative list of the core internationally recognized human
rights.” Id. at 13; see supra notes 34 and 67 and accompanying text (listing the internationally recognized
core human rights treaties).
124. Human Rights Council Res. 8/7, Mandate of the Special Representative of the SecretaryGeneral on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises,
8th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/8/7, para. 4(d) (June 18, 2008).
125. H.R.C. Res. 17/4, supra note 54, para. 6(f).
126. In contrast, SRSG Ruggie quickly responded to criticism raised by MiningWatch Canada
concerning the Guiding Principles’ overreliance on non-judicial grievance mechanisms. Having the Ruggie
Pulled Out From Under Us: From “Sanction and Remedy” to Non-Judicial Grievance Mechanisms,
MININGWATCH CANADA (June 6, 2011), http://www.miningwatch.ca/article/having-ruggie-pulled-outunder-us-sanction-and-remedy-non-judicial-grievance-mechanisms; see also John Ruggie, Response by UN
Special Representative on Business & Human Rights John Ruggie to MiningWatch Canada, BUS. & HUM.
RIGHTS RESOURCE CENTRE (June 15, 2011), http://www.business-humanrights.org/Links/Repository/
1006780/jump (showing that he responded to MiningWatch’s criticism within two weeks). This example,
however, may be a case of picking the proverbial low-hanging fruit. According to Ruggie’s response,
much of MiningWatch’s criticism “actually addresses a draft . . . released for public comment last
November, not the March final.” Id.
127. For John Ruggie’s plainspoken take on this, see Business and Human Rights: Together at Last?
A Conversation with John Ruggie, 35 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 117, 117 (2011) (describing the refusal of
the U.N. Commission on Human Rights to adopt the “Norms on Transnational Corporations and Other
Business Enterprises” because governments and businesses opposed the idea of making them legally
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The difficulty inherent in this challenge is reinforced by a survey of the
corporate community currently willing to engage even with seemingly nonthreatening, non-binding human rights principles. In practice, only a minute fraction
of the world’s businesses appear to be genuinely concerned with the human rights
implications of their activities. For example, the U.N. Global Compact, hailed as
“the world’s largest corporate citizenship and sustainability initiative,” has an
existing membership of only 8,000 participants, with approximately 6,000 being
businesses situated across 135 countries.128 While these numbers may appear
impressive at first glance, even the U.N. Secretary-General has labeled the
initiative’s current participation rate inadequate, insofar as it reflects only a small
percentage of the estimated “70,000 multinationals and millions of small
businesses.”129 Moreover, already more than 2,400 companies have faced expulsion
from the Global Compact’s esteemed membership “for failing to report to their
stakeholders on [human rights-related] progress they have made.”130 SRSG Ruggie
has confirmed this cynical manipulation by businesses of the Global Compact’s
human rights agenda: “Apparently [the corporations] simply wanted to sign up and
associate themselves with this U.N. initiative and get co-branded, but didn’t intend to
do anything.”131 This bleak picture is compounded when one considers that a survey
conducted by the SRSG identified fewer than 300 corporate entities with established
human rights policies.132
Along these lines, it is also worth recalling that the OECD and the European
Union, strong supporters of the Guiding Principles, represent only a small fraction of
the world’s nations. While these bodies play a vital role in shaping international
trade and commerce practices, they by no means represent global public opinion
concerning the SRSG’s Guiding Principles. In addition, the OECD’s revised 2011
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises are vulnerable to many of the same
criticisms leveled against the SRSG’s Guiding Principles. For example, the OECD
guidelines are drafted in a manner that may enable corporations to downgrade their
human rights responsibilities based on the country in which they operate.133 Acting
on such a variable yardstick, a corporation might pursue business opportunities in a
“rogue” state that has neglected to ratify relevant international human rights treaties,
and thus empower itself to act in a manner that would breach human rights norms if
undertaken elsewhere. In an attempt to foreclose this possibility, the OECD
guidelines suggest that “enterprises should seek ways to honour [human rights] to the
fullest extent which does not place them in violation of domestic law.”134 Relying on

binding).
128. U.N. Global Compact Participants, U.N. GLOBAL COMPACT, http://www.unglobalcompact.org/
ParticipantsAndStakeholders/index.html (last updated July 28, 2011).
129. Secretary-General Urges Companies to Join Global Compact, U.N. GLOBAL COMPACT,
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/news/134-06-21-2011 (last updated June 21, 2011).
130. Id.
131. Business and Human Rights: Together at Last?, supra note 127, at 120.
132. Only companies that have adopted a formal policy statement explicitly referring to human rights
are included in the list, whether or not they participate in the Global Compact. Company Policy
Statements on Human Rights, BUS. & HUM. RTS. RESOURCE CENTRE, http://www.businesshumanrights.org/Documents/Policies (last updated July 6, 2012). Over half of the corporations listed are
European. Business and Human Rights: New United Nations Guidelines, supra note 110.
133. OECD GUIDELINES, supra note 105, at 31.
134. Id. at 32.
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this type of tenuous language opens the door to any number of scenarios that are
antithetical to respect for universal human rights norms. For example, a corporation
acting under the pretense of complying with domestic law could intentionally exclude
from its workforce members of a persecuted minority group yet still claim to be
satisfying the guidelines. Here, the plain choice that would ensure compliance with
the spirit, if not letter, of international human rights law would be to terminate
operations in that country until the discriminatory legislative framework is rectified.
This route, however, is neither required nor recommended by the OECD guidelines
or the Guiding Principles.
Even if one follows additional OECD guidance suggesting that enterprises,
irrespective of country of operation, should refer to “at a minimum . . . the
internationally recognised human rights expressed in the International Bill of Human
Rights”135 (i.e. the UDHR, ICCPR, and ICESCR), businesses are still left with
permission to violate rights provided under other core international human rights
instruments, including the CERD, CEDAW, and CRC. In this regard, the OECD’s
standards mirror the same flawed departure point introduced under the SRSG’s
Guiding Principles:136 both cheapen a hard-fought elaboration of international
human rights law by casting aside key treaties intended to particularize safeguards
for historically vulnerable groups—such as racial minorities, women, and children—
and thereby shield them from further discrimination and maltreatment.137
Finally, the OECD’s endorsement of the SRSG’s approach to adverse human
rights impacts directly linked to a corporation’s operations, products, or services by
virtue of its relationship with another entity signals adoption of another flaw inherent
in the Guiding Principles. As noted above, applying the proposed subjective
framework in these types of scenarios affords the enterprise wide discretion in
defining its level of responsibility based on a variety of factors such as “the
enterprise’s leverage over the entity concerned, how crucial the relationship is to the
enterprise, the severity of the impact, and whether terminating the relationship with
the entity itself would have adverse human rights impacts.”138 From this perspective,
in addition to being premised on legitimating the perpetuation of business
transactions with actors responsible for human rights abuses, the OECD formulation
fails to establish any meaningful objective standard for corporate decision making
under these circumstances, thus opening the process to potential abuse.

CONCLUSION: NAVIGATING A POST-GUIDING PRINCIPLES WORLD
As the U.N. H.R.C. Working Group on the issue of human rights and
transnational corporations begins its mandate to further operationalize the SRSG’s
Guiding Principles, it is clear that the precise nexus between business and human
rights remains very much a work in progress. Businesses taking their first steps in a
“post-Guiding Principles” world must still confront the open question: What, if any,
human rights responsibilities are we expected to observe? While recent U.N. activity
135. Id.
136. Guiding Principles, supra note 3, at 13.
137. See id. at 13–14 (stating corporations should refer to other instruments when dealing with the
rights of women, children, and minorities, but failing to provide specific U.N. instruments as guidance
beyond the ICCPR and ICESCR); OECD GUIDELINES, supra note 105, at 31 (noting the chapter on
human rights is in line with Guiding Principles).
138. OECD GUIDELINES, supra note 105, at 33.
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may have bestowed a patina of authoritativeness on the SRSG’s Guiding Principles,
these principles remain—at least for the present time—non-binding. Nevertheless,
ongoing debate, civil society action, shifting domestic law, and the efforts of the U.N.
H.R.C. Working Group may all conspire in the future to generate a more binding
legal requirement on corporations to respect human rights norms, regardless of
enterprise size or location.
For their part, human rights NGOs are unlikely to back down from the
objective of a binding accountability regime for businesses enshrined under
international law. Indeed, the NGO campaign of attrition—being waged piecemeal
on the international level within intergovernmental fora as well as through domestic
courts around the world—shows no signs of letting up.139 In the latter context,
municipal developments indicate some traction for holding corporations accountable.
For example, in the United States, recent case law signals a divide in approach
concerning corporate liability under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS).140 A Second
Circuit majority in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum concluded that “corporate
liability has not attained a discernable, much less universal, acceptance among
nations of the world in their relations inter se, and it cannot not, as a result, form the
basis of a suit under the ATS.”141 However, other jurisdictions paint a different
understanding. A U.S. District Court (N.D. Ill.) explicitly rejected Kiobel as
contrary to “persuasive precedent indicating that corporations can be held liable
under the ATS,”142 based in part on the Eleventh Circuit’s Romero v. Drummond
Co., Inc. decision.143 Likewise, a Florida district court, also following the Eleventh
Circuit, recently denied Chiquita Brands International’s motion to dismiss ATS
claims filed against it “for torture, extrajudicial killing, war crimes, and crimes against
humanity.”144
In a related vein, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and
remanded a lower court decision rejecting personal jurisdiction over
DaimlerChrysler Aktiengesellschaft (DCAG) for allegedly allowing one of its
Argentinian subsidiaries to collaborate with “state security forces to kidnap, detain,
torture, and kill the plaintiffs and/or their relatives during Argentina’s ‘Dirty

139. See William Bradford, Beyond Good and Evil: The Commensurability of Corporate Profits and
Human Rights, 26 NOTRE DAME J.L ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 141, at 159–69 (2012) (describing strategies
NGOs have implemented to mandate compliance with corporate human rights obligations).
140. See Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2003) (“The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a
treaty of the United States.”).
141. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 148–49 (2d Cir. 2010); see also John
Gibeaut, Shell Gets a Pass on Nigerian Claims, But Tort Law’s Future Still Unclear, A.B.A. J., Jan. 2011 at
14, 15 (Regarding the majority decision, lead plaintiffs’ lawyer Paul L. Hoffman stated: “They issued [the
judicial opinion] without a single brief or a single word from either party . . . . I’ve never seen that in 30
years.”).
142. Holocaust Victims of Bank Theft v. Magyar Nemzeti Bank, 807 F. Supp.2d 689, 694 (N.D. Ill.
2011).
143. Id.; see also Romero v. Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303, 1315 (11th Cir. 2008) (“the law of this
Circuit is that [the ATS] grants jurisdiction from complaints of torture against corporate defendants”).
But see Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 744 F.Supp.2d 810, 818 (S.D. Ind. 2010) (holding “no
corporate liability exists under the ATS”). Both the Holocaust Victims and Flomo courts are within the
jurisdiction of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
144. In re Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc., 792 F.Supp.2d 1301, 1359 (S.D. Fla. 2011).
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War.’”145 Alluding to the ATS and state interest in adjudicating the suit, the Court
reasoned:
[A]lthough the events at issue did not take place in California and
although the plaintiffs are not California residents, the forum state does
have a significant interest in adjudicating the suit. California partakes in
the “shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental
substantive social policies.” Here, as the claims are predicated upon the
ATS and [Torture Victims Protection Act], that policy is providing a forum
to redress violations of international law by defendants who have enough
connections with the United States to be brought to trial on our shores,
even though the injury is to aliens and occurs outside our borders—“a
small but important step in the fulfillment of the ageless dream to free all
people from brutal violence.”146
DCAG is also drawing fire in a separate legal battle unfolding in New York
following a Second Circuit Appeals Court decision to remand a set of ATS claims
filed by dozens of individuals allegedly injured by DCAG’s apartheid era activities in
South Africa.147 Subsequently, the district court ruled against a number of ATS
claims but allowed certain others to move forward, including against DCAG, GM,
and Ford for aiding and abetting torture, cruel and inhuman treatment, extrajudicial
killing, and apartheid based on their provision of military equipment and trucks used
by government forces for attacks on protesting citizens and activists.148 In September
2009, the South African Government announced its support for the lawsuit,
withdrawing its previous opposition to the case.149
Returning to Kiobel, the U.S. Supreme Court accepted a petition for certiorari
and, following initial oral arguments in February 2012, directed the parties to file
supplemental briefs addressing the question of “[w]hether and under what
circumstances the Alien Tort Statute . . . allows courts to recognize a cause of action
for violations of the law of nations occurring within the territory of a sovereign other
than the United States.”150 The case itself, as decided by the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals, already comes with its own strongly worded rejection of the majority’s
interpretation of prevailing law concerning corporate liability—paradoxically in the
form of a concurring opinion:
The majority opinion deals a substantial blow to international law and its
undertaking to protect fundamental human rights. According to the rule

145. Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 644 F.3d 909, 911 (9th Cir. 2011).
146. Id. at 927 (citation omitted). In November 2011, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
unanimously denied a petition for rehearing and a petition for rehearing en banc. Bauman v.
DaimlerChrysler Corp. 676 F.3d 774, 774 (9th Cir. 2011).
147. Khulumani v. Barclay Nat. Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 264 (2d Cir. 2007). The Supreme Court,
unable to muster the requisite quorum of six after four Justices recused themselves, affirmed the Second
Circuit ruling without opinion. American Isuzu Motors, Inc. v. Ntsebeza, 553 U.S. 1028 (2008).
148. In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 617 F.Supp.2d 228, 264 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). But see In re Motors
Liquidation Co., 447 B.R. 150, 153 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (disallowing the “move for certification of [Apartheid
Claimants’] claims as class proofs of claim” and invoking Kiobel as controlling authority “binding on [it]
and every other lower court in the Second Circuit”).
149. Wendell Roelf, S. Africa Changes Tack, Supports U.S. Apartheid Suits, REUTERS, Sept. 4, 2009,
http://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFJOE5830DH20090904.
150. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 132 S. Ct. 1738 (2012) (mem.).
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my colleagues have created, one who earns profits by commercial
exploitation of abuse of fundamental human rights can successfully shield
those profits from victims’ claims for compensation simply by taking the
precaution of conducting the heinous operation in the corporate form.
Without any support in either the precedents or the scholarship of
international law, the majority take the position that corporations . . . are
not subject to international law, and for that reason such violators of
fundamental human rights are free to retain any profits so earned without
liability to their victims.151
In Canada, the courts of Quebec continue to grapple with a case alleging that an
Australian mining company facilitated a massacre of civilians in Kilwa, Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC) by providing logistical support to the Armed Forces of
the Democratic Republic of Congo (FARDC).152 The court of first instance rejected
Anvil Mining Ltd.’s preliminary motion to dismiss in part because of a finding that
the plaintiffs—family members of the victims—stood little reasonable chance of
judicial consideration in Australia or the DRC and ultimately risked being left
without any recourse to justice.153 The Quebec Court of Appeals overturned this
decision less than a year later, holding that the Superior Court judge erred in law by
failing to positively link the dispute in DRC to any of the activities directed out of
Anvil’s Montreal office.154 In a press release following the ruling, the Association
Canadienne contre l’impunite (ACCI) expressed its “deep[] disappoint[ment] that
the Court would deprive the victims of what could be their only remaining hope to
seek justice” and announced its intention to appeal the decision to the Supreme
Court of Canada.155
Against this backdrop of human-rights-NGO pressure and uncertainty within
the judicial arena, many corporations have opted to settle claims for human rights
violations out of court, often at great financial expense.156 Examples include three
settlements stemming from Holocaust-era litigation, a settlement for an estimated
$20 million by U.S. clothing retailers for alleged sweatshop violations, and over $15
million in compensation to the families of Ken Saro-Wiwa and John Kpuinen, two
men whose deaths were linked to Royal Dutch Petroleum’s oil-exploration efforts in
the Ogoni region of Nigeria.157

151. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 149–50 (2d Cir. 2010).
152. Association Canadienne contre l’Impunité v. Anvil Mining Ltd., 2011 QCCS 1966 paras. 2–4
(Can. Que.).
153. Id. paras. 38–39.
154. Anvil Mining Ltd. v. Association Canadienne contre l’Impunité, 2012 QCCA 117 paras. 91–94
(Can. Que.). The Appeals Court also questioned the plaintiff’s position—and the lower court’s
acquiescence—that Australia could not realistically serve as a more appropriate trial venue. Id. paras.
101–03.
155. Press Release, Canadian Ass’n Against Impunity, Congolese Massacre Survivors to Pursue
Justice at the Supreme Court of Canada (Jan. 31, 2012), http://www.globalwitness.org/library/congolesemassacre-survivors-pursue-justice-supreme-court-canada.
156. See, e.g., Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 937 (9th Cir. 2002) on reh’g en banc sub nom. John
Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005) (highlighting the uncertainty of corporate human
rights claims in the first human rights case in which jurisdiction was granted over a corporation).
Settlement was subsequently recognized in John Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005).
157. Michael Goldhaber, The Life and Death of the Corporate Alien Tort, LAW.COM (Oct. 12, 2010),
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202473215797.
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Faced with this reality, let’s return to the outstanding question: What, if any,
human rights responsibilities are corporations expected to observe? If thirty years
ago the usual modus operandi for business was profit without regard for “indigenous
rights” or “child labor,” moving forward that standard is necessarily—if slowly—
changing. Despite this gradual shift, business enterprises retain the autonomy to
determine their individual courses of action. In other words, the answer, for the
moment, is that corporations have the freedom to choose. On one hand, they can
opt to maintain the “pre-Guiding Principles” status quo and run the risk of being
perceived as a pariah falling outside the new “authoritative” corporate responsibility
consensus, including accepting any liability that may ensue. Alternatively, they can
fulfill the minimum recommendations established under the SRSG’s Guiding
Principles. Although this would arguably appear to satisfy current best practices, this
latter option still exposes the corporation to potentially costly liability down the
road—either in a court of law or the court of public opinion—if and when corporate
implementation of the Guiding Principles is deemed inadequate or defective.
By way of conclusion, therefore, this Article ends with a proposal for a third
option: that corporations get in front of what, by all indications, is a moving target
and take an embracive approach to human rights compliance. In practical terms, this
means instead of observing select “lowest common denominator” human rights
principles as envisioned by the SRSG, corporations should seek out higher ground by
complying with all applicable human rights treaty norms. This approach is premised
on an understanding that the notion of minimum standards in human rights law
“dialectically entails as well the notion of something more demanding than the
minimum—that is, the possible expansion of rights to which people are entitled.”158
Importantly, it also promises a variety of value-added benefits for willing business
enterprises. In the first instance, positioning a corporation to comply with due
diligence standards and other practices based on a more inclusive range of human
rights norms will significantly reduce or even potentially eliminate exposure to
human rights liability now and in the future. Simply put, aligning business activities
with the full spectrum of recognized international human rights norms can more
effectively help identify and prevent harmful impacts as well as insulate the
corporation from the evolutionary changes inherent in customary international law.159
Second, this approach promises to eliminate the uncertainty and inconsistency
associated with making corporate human rights responsibilities contingent upon a
given host country’s existing treaty obligations and the nature or scope of the
company’s activities therein. As U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary Daniel Baer has
observed, “In States that violate human rights, it will be more difficult for businesses
to respect those rights—because domestic law may require actions inconsistent with
internationally recognized human rights, because State practices encourage
businesses to take actions that undermine the enjoyment of human rights, or because
States involve businesses in their own human rights violations.”160 Establishing a
158. Jacek Kurczewski & Barry Sullivan, The Bill of Rights and the Emerging Democracies, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. Spring 2002, at 259.
159. This would require an expanded due diligence process, including sensitivity to relevant emerging
international human rights norms expressed outside of treaty regimes. See Giovanni Mantilla, Emerging
International Human Rights Norms for Transnational Corporations, 15 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 279, 292
(2009), available at https://apps.cla.umn.edu/directory/items/publication/300487.pdf (describing a method
of increased corporate responsibility through increased due diligence on the part of corporations).
160. Deputy Assistant Secretary Daniel Baer, Businesses and Transnational Corporations Have a
Responsibility
to
Respect
Human
Rights,
HUMANRIGHTS.GOV
(June
16,
2011),
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single transnational policy expressly aligned with the standards promulgated by the
U.N. human rights treaty bodies in place of the SRSG’s mercurial guidelines
promises corporations independence from variances derived from host state
practices, avoids potential conflicts arising from patchwork policies, and ultimately
lends itself to a more reliable process and outcome.161 Naturally, in the context of
TNC activity that gives rise to cultural, social, political, legal, and economic
differences, such a policy becomes even more essential. Moreover, implementing a
streamlined due-diligence process around a universally applicable human rights
policy also promises the added benefit of being more cost-effective.162
A third benefit of adopting an embracive human rights approach is the likely
spike in public goodwill directed at the corporation. This advantage should not be
understated. As the U.N. Global Compact demonstrates, businesses already
recognize the value of associating their brands with social responsibility and human
rights, even if they do not sincerely implement related undertakings.163 Boycotts
remain a powerful consumer tool, and such actions promise an even greater impact
as social awareness, activism, and Internet connectedness become further embedded
in global culture. Taking concrete measures to distinguish a corporation’s genuine
commitment to human rights from other free riders or generic endorsers of the
Guiding Principles therefore promises to go a long way in building a corporate brand
as well as consumer—and shareholder—confidence.
Finally, two derivative benefits associated with this “third way” proposal are
worth noting here. First, by more actively managing its human rights footprint, a
corporation can contribute to halting the larger cycle of human rights violations that
the Guiding Principles perpetuate. As noted, the SRSG’s standards enable business
enterprises to preserve relationships with human rights violators that may be directly
linked to their operations, products, or services.164 Rather than allow such
relationships to continue, an embracive human rights approach would operate to
shut them down. As a consequence, actors identified as human rights abusers would
be denied a source of economic oxygen and, more dramatically, as the allegations
against Anvil Mining illustrate, would potentially be denied the wherewithal to carry
out or continue human rights violations.165 This shift to requiring that business

http://www.humanrights.gov/2011/06/16/businesses-and-transnational-corporations-have-a-responsibilityto-respect-human-rights/.
161. In the event that a corporate head office is situated in a country enjoying stronger human rights
protections than afforded under international law, the domestic norms should govern the corporation’s
activities regardless of where they occur. See, e.g., Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,
art. 53, Dec. 18, 2000, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 5.
162. See, e.g., ICMM, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE MINING AND METALS INDUSTRY: INTEGRATING
HUMAN RIGHTS DUE DILIGENCE INTO CORPORATE RISK MANAGEMENT PROCESSES 6 (Mar. 2012),
http://wp.cedha.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/Integrating-human-rights-due-diligence.pdf
(discussing
human rights due diligence and explaining that the “[f]ailure to effectively address human rights risks can
lead to significant costs in terms of the management time required to respond to crises, and may impact a
company’s ability to access resources elsewhere or receive funding/insurance from some financial
institutions or export credit agencies”).
163. See U.N. GLOBAL COMPACT, http://www.unglobalcompact.org/ (last visited July 11, 2012)
(noting that corporate participants based in the United States include Starbucks, PepsiCo, Coca-Cola,
Nike, Ford Motor Company, General Electric, Hewlett-Packard, United Airlines, J.C. Penney, Pfizer, and
others).
164. See supra notes 92–93 and accompanying text.
165. See Congolese Raise Mining Lawsuit in Supreme Court, CBC NEWS (Mar. 26, 2012),
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relations conform to all international human rights norms can have a transformative
effect by prodding other enterprises into an embracive human rights business model
through a combination of peer pressure and the promise of potential economic
advantage. At the very least, the embracive approach is distinct from the SRSG’s
Guiding Principles insofar as it proposes a clear-sighted and principled stance against
interactions with recognized human rights violators. Lastly, this “third way” may
also operate to reduce or eliminate liability risks for individuals associated with the
business entity. Championing a corporate culture that respects and safeguards the
full range of international human rights law requires an environment where related
decisions are more closely scrutinized for compliance, concerns are identified and
resolved earlier, and managers and staff are empowered to act accordingly.
Perlmutter’s musings from half a century ago provide a relevant context for
closing.166 It remains accurate to say that corporations retain a significant potential
for positively shaping the world we live in, though this potential remains—at least for
the moment—mostly untapped and non-obligatory. If the Guiding Principles
demonstrate anything, it is that the international community is increasingly serious
about exploring how this potential can be harnessed as a means of minimizing
corporate actions that may cause harm to individuals, groups, and our planet’s
resources. From this vantage point, the more corporate counsel integrates a robust
understanding of existing international human rights into corporate decision-making,
the greater the likelihood will be of consistently and predictably minimizing or
eliminating conduct likely to trigger deleterious human rights consequences now and
into the future. This, coupled with the spillover benefits outlined above, should
weigh heavily in favor of adopting an approach that uses the Guiding Principles as a
starting point, but moves quickly to enlarge and enhance its reach.

http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/montreal/story/2012/03/26/congolese-families-look-to-supreme-court-inbid-to-sue-anvil-cp.html (explaining that if the Supreme Court of Canada decides to hear the case, there
could be “major implications on whether Canadian companies can be held accountable for their
involvement in human rights violations committed abroad”).
166. See Perlmutter, supra note 10, at 18 (remarking that “the senior executives engaged in building
the geocentric enterprise could well be the most important social architects of the last third of the
twentieth century”).
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